Abstract: This article reviews the general legal framework governing risk assessment of prisoners in the Israeli parole process. It highlights the excessive power the Israeli courts have accorded to the professional body responsible for providing risk assessments, which severely limits the parole board's discretion to order conditional release when prisoners persist in denying their crimes. Such prisoners, especially sex offenders, tend to be precluded from participation in treatment courses, thus substantially reducing their prospects of obtaining parole.
Parole Boards: Structure and Eligibility
The Israeli parole system is regulated by the Parole Act 2001, which provides a detailed scheme for the decision-making process, including eligibility and decision criteria, terms of parole, and other procedural and institutional aspects.
In order to be eligible for consideration, a prisoner must have completed two-thirds of his sentence or a term of 25 years. Prisoners sentenced for three to six months may apply to the Prison Commissioner, the administrative officer responsible for prison management.
Those sentenced to a term longer than six months may apply to a parole board, comprising: a judge, who presides; two expert members, representing criminology, social work, psychology, THE CATCH-22 IN ISRAEL'S PAROLE LAW 4 psychiatry, or education; 1 and an official from the Prison Service, in an advisory capacity, without the right to vote. Life prisoners who seek conditional release must apply to a special board composed of judges and experts who have greater seniority ( § §2-5, 32-33 of the Parole Act).
The Criteria for Parole
The primary criterion for granting conditional release is that the applicant "deserves to be released," and "his release poses no risk to public order" ( § §2,3,5) . This is supplemented by a detailed though not exhaustive list of considerations that a parole board may take into account ( §9). First, it should consider the risk posed to the prisoner's family, his victims, and the general public. In addition, it should take into account his conduct while incarcerated, and his prospects for rehabilitation. To this end, the following factors are to be examined:
(1) The specifics of the applicant's crime-its nature, severity, circumstances and effects.
(2) His criminal record, taking into account the nature, number, and severity of acts committed, including charges pending.
(3) Any past paroles, and the extent to which he abided by their conditions.
(4) The prisoner's personal situation, including age, family and social conditions.
In evaluating the candidate's conduct in prison, the parole board is required to consider such factors as drug use or treatment for addiction, any misconduct or violation of rules, breach of order, harm to other inmates or officers, jail break or late arrival from furlough, and suspected criminal activity. Also important is the attitude he has displayed toward labor or other rehabilitative opportunities. Implicit in this last factor is the concept that the prisoner must show remorse for his actions and recognize the need to change his criminal 1 An expert is defined as someone with five or more years' experience. Each board is supposed to have two of the five listed disciplines represented.
THE CATCH-22 IN ISRAEL'S PAROLE LAW 5 orientation before his application can be granted. Indeed, his attitude in this respect is typically reported by social workers and the board accords this factor serious weight in its decision. As we shall see, the prisoner's attitude toward the crime becomes a critical condition for granting parole where domestic violence and sex offenses are involved. When the prisoner is seeking parole from a life sentence, there is an express requirement to consider this attitude,
suggesting that this consideration is of particular importance when the crime is of such severity ( §10(b)).
2
Risk-Assessment Procedures
In addition to the considerations outlined above, a parole board must take into account a series of risk-assessment reports that are prepared prior to the hearing ( §9 (7)). One report, prepared by prison social workers, reviews the prisoner's personality traits, and his attitude to his crime and to the rehabilitative options offered to him. Another, drafted by the prison authorities, provides general information on the applicant, including personal data as well as his conduct while incarcerated. A third report, by the police or other security forces, assesses the risk the prisoner may pose to the public. Both prison and police reports may draw on intelligence obtained from within the prison and outside. Further expert reports are also required in certain situations, which will be delineated later in this article.
If the offense committed was sexual or violent, the victims are also entitled to be heard on the potential risk that would be posed to them if the prisoner were released ( §19 of the Rights of Crime Victims Act 2001). The Supreme Court has broadly interpreted this right, holding that a parole board must take into account not only any physical threat the prisoner may pose (which may be addressed by preventive orders or other measures) but also the psychological distress and insecurity that the victim may experience as a result of the offender's release, and the negative impact such feelings may have on the victim's own rehabilitation efforts (State of Israel v Ghanamah, 2008; Yeger v Prison Service, 2011; Chief Military Attorney v Zaher, 2011) .
The parole process may also include reports from the Prisoner Rehabilitation Authority (PRA), a statutory body that may prepare an assessment of the prisoner's need for rehabilitation throughout the parole period and, where appropriate, develop a rehabilitation plan. Such plans are prepared for prisoners who demonstrate strong rehabilitative prospectsthat is, who cooperate with the authorities while incarcerated and invest effort in reforming their criminal lifestyles. A rehabilitation plan typically includes an employment plan and/or participation in a therapy group. The PRA supervises the parolee's compliance with the plan and immediately informs the authorities if he violates the terms of his release. Due to severe resource shortages, the PRA falls short of providing services to all prisoners who might deserve them. As a result, some prisoners engage private specialists to prepare rehabilitation plans in support of their applications. According to the latest data, in 2010, 69% of parolees were released with PRA plans, and 17% with private plans (DPR, 2011) .
Public Confidence in Law Enforcement as a Ground for Withholding Parole
The crime for which the prisoner is imprisoned-its nature, severity, circumstances, and effects-may be considered not only for risk assessment but for proportionality. A parole board may refuse to grant parole if doing so would render the time spent actually incarcerated disproportionately short relative to the severity of the prisoner's actions and the length of the original sentence ( §10). However, the Parole Act limits the scope of this ground to cases in which granting parole would substantially undermine the values of deterrence and public confidence in the law enforcement system. This limitation is important because, otherwise, the very concept of parole could be seen as undermining public confidence by shortening
what has been determined to be the correct and appropriate punishment. Limiting the scope of public-confidence considerations highlights the forward-looking emphasis in the parole proceedings; instead of deterrence and retribution, they are meant to focus on possibilities for rehabilitation, which is also in the public interest.
The Conditions of Parole
Release on parole is by definition conditional, but the terms may vary ( §13 
Judicial Review Against a Decision on Parole
The parole board's decisions may be challenged before the Administrative Court by means of a judicial review ( §25) that is purely concerned with administrative matters, as distinct from an appeal, in which the court would scrutinize the merits of the decision. The
Administrative Court intervenes only when the board is shown to have exceeded its power as defined by law, or to have rendered a decision that was manifestly unreasonable, based on irrelevant considerations, or overlooked relevant considerations. As a general rule, judicial intervention in parole decisions is limited to extremely rare instances (State of Israel v Ghanamah, 2008; Mor-Hai v Attorney General, 2012) .
This conservative intervention policy is of utmost constitutional importance, dictated by two fundamental principles: the rule of law and separation of powers. The rule of law requires courts to ensure that the executive does not exceed its legal powers or violate the demands of fairness and justice (e.g., equality, transparency, impartiality, the right to be heard, the duty to provide reasons). The separation of powers requires that courts not intervene in the content of administrative decisions, even when it disagrees with them. Also, administrative agencies are perceived to possess specialized expertise that a court lacks.
5 According to Part C of the Parole Act, the parole board may refrain from revoking the parole in exceptional cases and merely restart the parole period, unless the prisoner was sentenced to prison for the crime committed while on parole. This option can be exercised only once. Furthermore, in exceptional circumstances, the parole board may order that the prisoner spends only part of the parole period in prison (but not less than half).
Special Risk Assessment
There are three categories of parole applicant for which professional risk assessments When an MHC report is required, a parole board may grant parole only if the report rules out dangerousness to the public. Otherwise, if the board wishes to grant parole without first obtaining an MHC report, or in the face of one that establishes any degree of dangerousness, it must articulate "special reasons" for such a decision and also stipulate suitable supervisory measures to guarantee public safety. As we shall further see below, the When a MCPDV or RCTI report is required, the law does not require that it rule out dangerousness to the victim(s) as a condition for parole, but it does provide that such reports must be furnished to the parole board. This ensures that parole is granted only after careful deliberation and thorough examination of a comprehensive information base that takes into account the victim's specific interests and needs. In practice, parole boards decide against MCPDV/RCTI reports only in the most rare and exceptional circumstances (Yeger v Prison Service, 2011) . Thus, the law treats sex offenders, the mentally compromised and domestic violence offenders in much the same manner; in each of these categories, if any of the professional assessments point to high risk, parole is unlikely to be granted.
Psychiatric Risk Assessment of Sex Offenders
Sex offenders are subject to a strict requirement to obtain a favorable report from the same body that evaluates mentally ill prisoners. This has been justified on the ground that some sex offenders suffer from psychiatric problems that are expressed in deviant sexual activity, and are subject to intense sexual urges that they can neither control nor express in acceptable forms. While acknowledging that this diagnosis may not apply to a significant portion of sex offenders, the MHC defends this general requirement by arguing that even nonpsychiatric sex offenders are prone to sex recidivism more than other criminals and that, in any case, an examination must take place to rule out psychopathology (Al-Obeid (Curra, 1984) ; rather, it is "a type of pervasive patriarchal violence against women" and, accordingly, rapists are "far from being 'deviates', they are all-too-normal" (Bryden & Grier, 2011) . Finally, the MHC's risk assessment is not limited to the parole period, but measures it also beyond, taking perhaps too far the idea that parole operates as an incentive for a whole life-change.
We shall now see that the requirement of psychiatric examinations for sex offenders becomes particularly problematic in the context of prisoners who insist on their innocence.
Sex Offenders Who Deny the Crime
There are various paths for rehabilitation offered by the Prison Service, ranging from educational activity, labor inside or outside prison, and treatment. Generally, all prisoners are interviewed by social workers and, if found cooperative, willing and able to change, may be integrated into a suitable rehabilitation activity (PCO no. 04.54.02). Therapeutic treatment offered by the Prison Service, especially to violent and sex offenders, may include individual or group therapy, anger management, social and interpersonal skills development, social sensitivity, and victim and crime understanding (Birger et al, 2011; Margolin et al, 2013) .
These usually target those who are willing to take responsibility and express genuine regret This matter has received significant attention in relation to sex offenders. From a legal point of view, conviction of a sex crime creates a presumption of dangerousness that the prisoner should rebut. However, as a matter of general policy, the MHC refuses to assess the dangerousness of deniers. Since the law requires an MHC report ruling out dangerousness as a condition for granting parole, the MHC's position strips the prisoner of any realistic ability to rebut the presumption of dangerousness. The result is that, for all practical purposes, the parole prospects of deniers are near zero.
This legal framework is problematic. It totally discounts the scenario of a wrongful conviction and, worse still, the prospect of conditional release creates a powerful incentive for prisoners to confess, regardless of whether they committed the crime or genuinely regret their actions (the MHC's ability to detect such maneuvers remains an open question) (Tsadik, 1996) . This is not implausible, considering the well-established incidence of criminal suspects making false confessions even when the adverse consequence of conviction is attached (Kassin & Wrightsman 1985) . Furthermore, making confession into a virtual threshold requirement for parole of sex offenders is discriminatory, since all other prisoners may insist on their innocence without parole boards being formally precluded from granting them parole.
The flip-side is that there are other types of offenders whose criminal activity may be rooted in compulsion-illegal gamblers, serial killers, or thieves, for example-yet they are not required to undergo psychiatric examination (it might be understandable if the law identified a broad range of potentially compulsive offenders and, citing resource limitations, merely gave priority attention to sex criminals as posing the most serious threat, but this has not occurred).
Moreover, to require a full and comprehensive confession as a condition for admission to treatment, rather than allowing for confession and remorse to be potentially one of its THE CATCH-22 IN ISRAEL'S PAROLE LAW 13 goals, seems to put the cart before the horse. Early data shows that, if admitted to treatment, deniers can be helped to admit guilt, suggesting that denial should be an issue for treatment rather than a barrier to it (Marshall, 1994; Maletzky, 1996) . In addition, the literature recognizes various types and degrees of denial (including absolute denial of commission of the act, blaming the victim or a third party for causing the commission, or denying that harm was caused) that may not merit the same treatment. There is also a wide range of personal and social reasons why a rightly convicted person may nevertheless deny his actions (Cooper, 2005; Tsadik, 1996) -because he is ashamed of his actions and wishes to avoid social stigma;
because he wishes to protect his family; or because certain offenses make him a target for harassment by other inmates. For that matter, a prisoner may also wish to remain consistent with his original defense strategy, especially when there is a prospect of appeal. These alternative explanations for the refusal to confess a crime demonstrate the rigidness of a 'noconfession-no-parole' rule such as the one currently in place in Israel.
Furthermore, research does not conclusively support denial as a risk factor for recidivism, its importance as a treatment target, or its impact on treatment outcome (Lund, 2000; Yates, 2009) . Although some challenge the very existence of a correlation between recidivism and factors such as denial, lack of remorse, lack of victim sympathy, and lack of motivation to seek treatment (Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, 2005) , others have debated the magnitude and conclusiveness of such an association. For example, some studies show that the validity of the denial factor as a predictor of recidivism may depend on other factors, such as the degree of risk otherwise ascribed to the offender, or the victim's relationship to the offender (Harkins et al, 2010) .
Aside from concerns over the unequal treatment accorded to this category of offender, from a public policy standpoint, it should be considered that it is the public at large who stand THE CATCH-22 IN ISRAEL'S PAROLE LAW 14 to suffer if sex offenders are released from prison at the end of their full sentence without having received any treatment.
The Alleged Importance of Confession
The MHC stands by the present state of law, arguing that it is necessary to hold a clinical interview to establish whether the prisoner suffers from a psychological condition that predisposes him to sex crimes. The interview is meant to ascertain the prisoner's attitude to his crime, whether it was premeditated, whether similar incidents occurred in the past, and so on.. When the prisoner denies the very commission of the crime, the clinical interview is futile and it is not possible to fathom his psychological world (Cohen, 1996 (Cohen, , 1997 Tsadik, 1996; 1998; .
The MHC responds to this criticism by challenging the reliability of alternative assessment tools (Cohen, 1997; Al-Obeid v Prison Service, 2001) . In its view, statistical assessments are insensitive to the prisoner's individual and personal experience, are highly unreliable in predicting recidivism and, in any case, require a database of a size that is unavailable in Israel. As for "indirect discussion" interviews and psychodiagnostic tests, the MHC maintains that they do not provide access to the prisoner's "internal world," since those who deny committing a crime tend to provide false information on issues unrelated to that crime in order to portray a positive and undangerous profile. The MHC further observes that shown that structured clinical assessment is more reliable and valid than unstructured assessment (e.g., Monahan, 1981) and, in any case, the use of actuarial tools cannot be dismissed in such a categorical fashion as suggested by the MHC. It might be worth considering the application of such well-validated models of offender rehabilitation as the Risk-Needs-Responsivity or Good Lives models (Bonta & Andrews, 2007) .
The Supreme Court's Stance on the Debate
For many years the MHC applied an absolute assumption that, absent an admission of guilt, it was not possible to assess the prisoner's dangerousness. This policy was affirmed by the Supreme Court on a number of occasions, until the case of Al- Obeid v Prison Service (1998) , concerning a prisoner whose conviction on charges of murder and rape had been one of the most controversial in Israel's history. Pressed by the Court during the proceedings, the MHC amended its policy so that admission of guilt will no longer be the sine qua non for preparing a risk-assessment report. Prisoners will be assessed individually and, in suitable cases, given further examination in greater depth, including inpatient observation in a mental hospital.
However, under the revised policy, admission is still a major factor in the MHC's assessment and little practical change seems to have emerged. Indeed, in the case of Aslan v State of Israel (2002) the Supreme Court established that not a single sex offender who insisted on his innocence had been assessed by MHC. Despite this finding, the Supreme Court approved of the MHC's stance by reference to the separation of powers principle, whereby the court is precluded from intervening in the professional debate between the MHC and its critics on risk-assessment methodology, unless the MHC had subscribed to an unreasonable school of thought, which was not the case.
The Supreme Court reinforced this position by stressing that, not only should the MHC not be blamed for insisting on a confession, it was proper for it to presuppose that the prisoner has committed the actions of which he was convicted, because this was the finding of a final judgment delivered by a court of law. When guilt is presumed, it is legitimate to view denial as an alarm signal that should be taken into account in assessing the prisoner's dangerousness.
The Court's refusal to take into account the wrongful-conviction scenario might be explained as reflecting a mindful willingness to sacrifice on the altar of public safety the interests of innocent prisoners wrongly imprisoned. This may be based on an inevitable working assumption that the MHC has no adequate tools or authority to re-examine a court judgment, and on the idea that, in any case, parole is a privilege, not a right. However, the Court's firm position that convictions create an automatic presumption of high risk might also be said to reflect a dogmatic belief that all convictions are correct (as might be implied in Ghanamah v Parole Board, 2010) .
Be that as it may, the Israeli law is not unique in this respect. For example, the United
States Supreme Court has ruled that sex offenders form a special class of prisoners that may be subject to additional scrutiny and rehabilitation ( Kansas v Hendricks, 1997) , and that there are legitimate therapeutic purposes in requiring an admission of guilt in the treatment of sex offenders and as a prior condition for granting parole (McKune v Lile, 2002; Newman v Beard, 2010 
Why the Power Accorded to the MHC is Excessive
The MHC's powerful position may be best exemplified by the case of Nagar v State of Israel (2011) , where most of the relevant conditions for parole were favorable, except for an MHC report. The prisoner was not held on remand during his trial, suggesting that he was not assessed by the court as being sufficiently dangerous to justify arrest. Furthermore, the prisoner had no criminal record, and his crime concerned a single incident of partial sex contact based on fraudulently obtained consent. He was sentenced for a relatively short term of 14 months, during which his conduct was exemplary. He also admitted some of the actions and made a convincing expression of regret, while his failure fully to admit guilt was later attributed to a wish to avoid embarrassment before his family. However, since his confession was incomplete, he was denied treatment and therefore the MHC assessed his risk level as low-medium. Even so, the Prison Service agreed to grant him regular furloughs on conditions that were strictly observed by him. The parole board was likewise favorably impressed and decided to grant him parole. However, this decision was faulted by the court for being extremely unreasonable by virtue of its failure to pay sufficient regard to the MHC's risk assessment.
The court's willingness in this instance to depart from its traditional reluctance to intervene in an administrative decision, setting aside the preponderance of positive indications, suggests that whatever limited discretion remains for a parole board to consider whether the risk may be controlled or supervised effectively despite a presumption of dangerousness, is largely theoretical. Parole boards and courts may therefore become a rubber stamp, largely unable to supervise the MHC's activity. This concern is significant if we consider that the Supreme Court has characterized the MHC as a neutral, official and professional body whose experience has no equivalent in Israel, which means that its risk assessments must be treated as decisive and trump any evidence to the contrary produced by the prisoner, including private expert opinion (Al- Obeid v Prison Service, 2011) .
Automatically preferring the MHC's report over any other evidence strips prisoners who insist on their innocence of any realistic chance to obtain parole.
Faced with the authorities' refusal to allow them access to treatment, deniers have attempted to overcome this hurdle by offering to enter into private rehabilitation and treatment plans once they were released on parole. The Supreme Court rejected such attempts as a matter of principle (Chief Military Attorney v Zaher, 2011) . It reasoned that the riskassessment process is better served by in-prison treatment, because when the prisoner appears before the parole board he will have completed the treatment, allowing his success to be measured on a more comprehensive and reliable basis. Allowing prisoners to utilize private plans that offer treatment only after parole is granted removes the incentive to admit guilt and prove their rehabilitation intentions through in-prison treatment. The Court expressed a further concern that such a course of action would create an inequality between prisoners who could afford the expenses of a private plan and those who could not.
This reasoning has its logic, but it cannot justify blind reliance on the MHC and absolute refusal to consider private risk-assessment reports. For one thing, judicial tribunals regularly consider private expert opinions brought by criminal defendants or civil litigants, whether to challenge official experts or to establish a scientific or professional finding; thus, automatically granting greater credence to a state-appointed expert undercuts a fundamental principle of adversarial justice (Fuller & Randall, 1958 Second, the finding of relatively low recidivism rates among sex offenders is consistent with findings from other jurisdictions. For example, a study in England and Wales found a rate of 4.3% after four years, and 8.5% after six years (Hood et al, 2002; Shute, 2004) . In the US and Canada, a meta-analysis study found an average recidivism rate of 13.7% in an average follow-up period of 5-6 years (Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, 2005; Harris & Hanson, 2004) . These findings are not necessarily reassuring. It stands to reason that many more property complaints are filed than sex crime complaints, which are harder to detect and prosecute. As is well-known, sex crimes are underreported because victims face tremendous difficulty in reporting such crimes to the authorities (Tjaden & Thoennes, 2006) . Moreover, sex crimes can pose special evidentiary difficulties-when, for example, the victim is a child too young to give reliable testimony or when no physical force was exerted to coerce the victim. The offender's awareness of such probative difficulties may make punishment seem unlikely, undermining its deterrent effect.
In Chief Military Attorney v Zaher (2011) , the Supreme Court approved of the MHC's unfavorable position concerning parole of deniers, holding, among other things, that the recidivism rate of 33.1% among parolees is still a high one; thus, it reasoned, if even those THE CATCH-22 IN ISRAEL'S PAROLE LAW 21 who had been determined to pose a low risk were highly prone to recidivism, even more caution should be exercised when the MHC has pronounced the risk to be high. However, as noted above, the 33.1% figure represents the general recidivism rate among all offenders who obtained parole (not only sex offenders), whereas the sex offenders' recidivism rate was substantially lower-19.3% (which includes those who obtained parole and those who did not). What is missing is the rate of recidivism among sex offenders who were paroled (which could also be broken down to two rates: those who recidivate on sex crimes and those who recidivate on other crimes). If this figure turned to be high, it could have suggested that even those who were assessed as low risk were prone to higher recidivism than other offenders.
Such a figure could have also provided some indication of the extent to which confessionbased treatment actually reduced recidivism, and whether the MHC's predictions of low risk were accurate.
An attempt to measure such factors was conducted in England and Wales. Hood et al (2002) found that 92% of the sex-offender prisoners who had been identified by at least one member of the parole board as 'high risk' were not convicted of a further sex crime at the end of a four-year follow-up period, and 87% were not convicted of any serious violent offense.
When measured over six years, the rates were 78% and 72%, respectively. Furthermore, with one exception, all the prisoners in this study who were subsequently convicted of a further sexual crime were not deniers of guilt (the difference was statistically different). While it is true that the re-conviction rate does not entirely overlap with recidivism, as many offenses remain undetected, these findings provide strong reasons to investigate and empirically substantiate the presumption of Israeli parole law that denial is associated with risk.
Signs of Change
The Supreme Court's approval of the MHC's position has not been totally unqualified.
On a number of occasions, the Court has expressed concern over the serious consequences the Supreme Court's holding that the MHC needed to reconsider its policy, the parole board ordered the MHC to establish a therapy group for denying prisoners, in which Zaher might be included. The MHC ignored this request for some time, eventually explaining that it refused to establish such group because its low prospects could not justify the significant resources it might require. The MHC's dismissive response to the parole board's order led the board to
give greater weight to the private-expert report presented by the prisoner and, accordingly, grant parole.
While still deferring to the MHC's professional stance, and thus revoking the board's decision, the Supreme Court reiterated the need to consider establishing a treatment course for denying prisoners. The Court held that this possibility should be explored seriously in light of the severe practical consequences of the crime denial. It may become too difficult, the Court went on to say, to sustain a policy that deprives prisoners of parole on the ground of their 
Conclusion
This article has reviewed the general legal framework that governs the Israeli parole system, focusing in particular on sex offenders and procedures for assessing the risks that their early release might pose. As we have seen, the MHC's refusal to assess sex offenders who deny their crime, coupled with the preclusion of such prisoners from in-prison treatment, have in fact stripped sex offenders of any viable chance to rebut the presumption of dangerousness created by their conviction. Their insistence on their innocence is thus likely to cost them any realistic chance to obtain parole. While the MHC's professional justification has its own logic, the resulting Catch 22 situation demands a critical reinvestigation. This THE CATCH-22 IN ISRAEL'S PAROLE LAW 24 revision cannot be seriously undertaken without further empirical research on recidivism among Israeli sex offenders and prisoners in general. Recent case law shows that the Israeli Supreme Court is losing patience with the MHC's failure to follow its advice and set up therapy for non-admitters. Indeed, as Lord Acton put it more than a century ago:
"Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great men are almost always bad men."
